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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PETER M. LOWE,
Special Administrator of
Estate ofT. 0. Nelson,
Plaintiff and Appella;nt,
-vs.MAX ROSENLOF and
MAX ROSENLOF
CONSTRUCTION CO.,
a partnership,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case
No. 9348

BRIEF O·F RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This suit was brought by the appellant to recover
damages for an alleged breach of a written subcontract
and for the conversion of some prefabricated forms used
in pouring concrete. The respondents had the prime contract to build a high school building in Lehi, Utah. They
subcontracted the basic concrete work to appellant. The
appellant alleges that the respondents "without legal ex1
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cuse excluded" appellant from the work and converted
the tools, materials and concrete forms which appellant
had on the job. (R. 4) Respondents counterclaimed,
contending that the appellant had breached the contract
by abandoning the work. (R. 6) TJ:le trial court found
that the appellant had abandoned the work and awarded
damages to the respondents. It also found that respondents had converted part of the concrete forms. Plaintiff
has appealed.
We do not agree with the statement of facts made
by the appellant. It ignores the decision of the trial
court which resolved the conflicts in the evidence in favor
of respondents. Since, however, two of the three points
raised go to the sufficiency of the evidence, we believe that
we can best detail the evidence as a part of our Argument.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I

THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT
THE APPELLANT BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY ABANDONING THE WORK AND
REQUIRING RESPONDENTS TO COMPLETE IT.
PorNT II

SINCE APPELLANT BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY ~\BANDONING THE \VORK, HE
IS NOT ENTITLED TO CONTINUE TO ENFORCE THE BENEFITS OF THE CONTRACT.
2
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PoiNT III
TIIE FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE FORl\IS CONVERTED HAD A MARI\:ET
VALUE OF $4,000.00 IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
ARGUMENT
(Tr. refers to the transcript of the evidence, and (R)
to the reconl of the pleadings and motions.)
The trial court has found that the appellant abandoned the work and required the respondents to complete
it. The primary issue to be determined is whether or not
the trial court's finding in this regard is supported by
substantial evidence. If this finding is sustained by the
evidence, then, although the plaintiff might be permitted
to recover for the value of the work performed by him
on a theory of quantum meruit, he can not recover on the
contract. His own material breach of the contract is a bar
to an action to enforce it. Because of the importance of
this issue, we first address ourselves to it, although it is
Point III in the appellant's brief.

PoiNT I
THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT
THE APPELLANT BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY ABANDONING THE WORK AND
REQUIRING RESPONDENTS TO COMPLETE IT.
The court expressly found in Finding No. 5 that the
plaintiff was in serious financial distress on August 1,
3
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1958; that his labor and materialmen were unpaid, and
that ''on or about September 9, 1958, the plaintiff abandoned the work and the contract and defendant was required at said time to take over and complete plaintiff's
work." (R. 106)
This court has stated on numerous occasions that a
:finding of fact made by the trial court will not be disturbed
if it is based on substantial evidence. See Child v. Child,
8 u t. 2d 361, 332 p. 2d 981.
There is ample evidence here to support the court's
finding. At the outset we direct this court's attention
to the testimony of Max Rosenlof. He testified that he
made a long distance telephone call to the appellant's
home on September 9, 1958. (Tr. 136) The appellant
admits that the call was made. (Tr. 83) Both admit that
the initial inquiry made by Mr. Rosenlof concerned appellant's absence from the job, and that appellant advised that he was trying to sell his home. ( Tr. 83, 136)
At this point the parties disagree as to what was said.
Mr. Rosenlof testified (as the trial court found) that
appellant said he could not go on, and that respondents
would have to take over.
''When I got him on the telephone I said, 'Ted,
there's got to be something done on that job. I
haven't seen you on that job for approximately
two weeks. The men are running wild and getting
in trouble because they ha-ve not been getting their
pay checks' * * *
"I asked him about getting down on the job
because the job was running \vild and he said,
4
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t[

'Max, you are just going to have to take the job
over; I am broke; I have got a lot of people pressuring· me for money and I can no longer finance
the job and I am about going crazy. I am going
to lose my house ; I am going to lose my trucks,
the forms and the equipment.' He says, 'I have
been home trying to sell my house so that I can get
some operating capital to keep on operating with.''
(Tr. 136-7)
The appellant denies this. (Tr. 84) But the trial
court did not believe him and an examination of the testimony demonstrates why. It is admitted that the phone
call was made about September 9th. (Tr. 83) and that on
the morning of the lOth, Rosenlof did take over the job.
(Tr. 33) If, as the appellant testified (Tr. 83, 33), Rosenlof was satisfied with the answer that appellant would
be back down on the job in a day or two, and the conversation had ended with that understanding, it is not
likely that he would take over the work the following
morning. There is not any dispute in the evidence at all
concerning the fact that Rosenlof did take over the following morning. (Tr. 33, 102) This is exactly what would
have been expected if the substance of the phone conversation was as Rosenlof testified; but it is completely inconsistent with what would have been expected if the
phone call had ended as appellant testified.
Appellant's own conduct after he learned that Rosenlof had taken over the job likewise is completely inconsistent with his testimony at the trial. If the telephone
conversation had ended with appellant's assurance that
he would return to the work in a day or two, and with
5
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Rosenlof apparently satisfied, Nelson would have been
very much surprised by the respondent's action in taking over the work the following morning. It is completely
illogical and contrary to ordinarily expected conduct
under these circumstances that appellant would not have
contacted Rosenlof to find out why. Appellant did not
seek to find out why; his only reaction was to have his
wife go to Rosenlof to try to get some money to cover
appellant's payroll checks which were "bouncing." (Tr.
106-7) This conduct on the part of appellant demonstrates
that he must have known when the parties concluded
their telephone conversation on September 9th that the
work was going to be taken over. Thus, when he was
told by his foreman (Tr. 87) that Rosenlof had taken
over, he did not need to call Rosenlof- he already had
discussed this on September 9th, and knew why.
The direct testimony of Rosenlof to the effect that
Nelson told him he (Nelson) would have to quit and that
Rosenlof would have to complete the work is further corroborated by various other convincing bits of evidence.
First, Rosenlof testified that appellant had stated
as his reason for quitting that he was in severe financial
distress. This is entirely consistent ·with what the actual
facts were, for appellant was in financial distress. A
bill for work performed by Rex Industries way back in
.Niarch was still unpaid. (Tr. 6"7 -8) The suppliers who had
furnished the lumber for the doing of the work had not
been fully paid. (Tr. 70-71) Arnold Machinery, from
whom he had rented a vibrator in April, had only been

6
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paid one $90.00 payment. (Tr. 71) Conesco, from "\Yhom
he was renting part of the forms, had written a demand
letter on August 28th, telling of a bill for $2429.32, which
wns overdue. (Ex. 16, 2, 68) Some of the payroll checks
issued to cover the work period from August 1st to Angust 15th had not cleared when presented, and some of
the men had not been paid since the 1st of August. (Tr.
94) Thus, what was happening on the job is exactly what
Rosenlof said he told Nelson and what Nelson told him.
Rosenlof said the men were ''running wild'' because they
hadn't been paid, and that Nelson had to do something
about the job. (Tr. 136-7) Nelson responded that he
was broke, and that Rosenlof would have to take over.
(Tr. 136-7) Thus, while we have only Rosenlof's testimony as to what was said, it is not likely that Rosenlof
called long distance merely to pass the time of day. It
is more likely that the trouble which was occurring on
the job was the subject matter of that telephone conversation (as Rosenlof testified); that he did tell Nelson of
the trouble; that Nelson, because he was in financial distress, did say that respondents would have to take over,
and that respondents therefore did so.
Second, an independent witness, to-wit, l{elsey Chatfield, inspector for the architect, testified that on
four or five occasions within a month to six weeks before Nelson left the job, appellant told Chatfield that
appellant was in financial difficulty; that he couldn't finance the work, and he used the expression, ''he would
have to quit." (Tr. 119) This bit of evidence is important in two respects. First, if Chatfield was telling the

7
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truth, Nelson was not, because Nelson testified under
oath that he had no such conversation with Chatfield.
(Tr. 88) If Nelson would not tell the court the truth,
about this, how could he be believed on other matters~
Secondly, if Chatfield was the one telling the truth, then
for a month to six weeks before September 9th Nelson
was advising the inspector that he was going to have to
quit the job because he couldn't finance it.
Third, in another material respect the court would
be justified in refusing to believe the appellant as to the
substance of the conversation on September 9th. Appellant stated on direct examination (Tr. 34) and on
cross-examination (Tr. 84, 87 and 99) that "absolutely,"
they did not discuss taking over the work on September
9th. Yet on his deposition, he stated exactly the opposite.
On his deposition, he was asked for the substance of the
telephone conversation, and he answered, ''and he (Rosenlof) said he was taken over." (Tr. 85) He was pressed
on the deposition for more details about this conversation, and he answered, ''I just don't remember what the
discussion was, only that he was taking the job over."

''Q. Did he tell you whyt A. No, he just said he
was taking the job over that ·was all." (Tr. 86)
Thus, we have the appellant at the trial testifying
under oath that the subject of Rosenlof taking the job
over was not discussed ( Tr. 87, 99) and yet on his deposition he testified that it was. (Tr. 86) He certainly was
either not telling the truth at the time of the trial or
else was not telling the truth at the time of the deposition.
8
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This (like his testimony about his talks with Chatfield)
indicated that he was not being wholly truthful 'vith the
court.
Thus to sustain the trial court's finding that appel~
lant abandoned the work and required respondents to
complete it, we first have Rosenlof's direct testimony that
he told Nelson the unpaid men were running wild, and
Nelson would have to do something, and Nelson said he
was having financial trouble and was going to quit and
that respondents would have to take over. Respondents,
consistent with this, did take over the next morning.
Nelson did nothing - didn't even contact respondents about it. He was in financial distress, his men were
unpaid, his materialmen were unpaid, and he for a month
had been telling Chatfield he was going to quit. The only
conflicting testimony we have is the testimony of Nelson
to the effect that a taking over of the work was not discussed and Rosenlof was satisfied when Nelson said he
would return to the job in a couple of days. But Nelson
had not told the same story on his deposition; he had
denied talking with Chatfield about quitting, yet evidenced no surprise when Rosenlof did take over. The
court believed Rosenlof and the finding is fully supported
by the evidence.
Finally, the appellant argues under Point III that
the financial difficulties plaguing the appellant were
caused by the failure of the respondent to make payments
in accordance with the terms of the contract. This just
9
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simply is not supported by the evidence and is contrary
to the trial court's findings. The respondents went far
beyond their contract obligations in an effort to help the
appellant get the job done. Specifically, we note the
following:
(a) Respondents cosigned with appellant for a loan
from Geneva Rock Products Co. for $1,000.00 to raise
the money to help appellant get started on the job. They
certainly had no contract obligation to do so, but everyone admits that they did. (Tr. 149, 52)
(b) .Appellant admitted that he understood that he
was to paid only once each month for the work he had
done, (Tr. 60) and the subcontract itself clearly so provides. (R. 10) However, through .August 9th, respondents paid appellant twice a month. (Tr. 61-62) In this
regard, it is without dispute that by .August 9th respondents had paid appellant $34,540.00, and also had made
a $500.00 payment to Geneva Rock Products on the loan.
(Tr. 21) The times when these payments were made
are set out in full at R. 53 in the findings.
(c) Since appellant brought this suit for breach of
contract he had the burden of proving that he had not
been paid in accordance with estimates submitted . .A demand was made at the trial for him to produce the estimates, (Tr. 65) and he produced four. (Ex. 8 and 12) (Tr.
154). These totaled only $29,500.00, and cover bills for
work done from .April to .August 1st. (Tr. 156) .Appellant did not know amount billed for 1\Iarch, if any (Tr.
63). The court expressly found "that no estimate was
10
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submitted h:· the plaintiff to the defendant for work done
during the month of August.'' (Finding 5, Tr. 106) Although Nelson said he had one, he could not produce it.
(Tr. 156) Nor did he give the amount.
There thus is no evidence whatever to sustain any
contention that the amounts paid did not exceed the estimates submitted. The total estimates shown by the evidence are the four contained in Exhibits 8 and 12. These
total $29,500.00 for work done through August 1st, (for
April, May, June and July) and the stipulated payments
show that respondents had paid the appellant $34,540.00
for the same period of time ( Tr. 21) and in addition had
paid $500.00 on the loan from Geneva Rock Products
Company.
(d) Under Point III of appellant's brief, he sets forth
a computation of the percentages of the total contract
price which had been received by respondents at the end
of each month. He argues that by September lOth appellant was, under these figures, entitled to at least $43,670.00.
It is difficult for us to understand the logic of this argument. In the first place, the percentages appellant is using
are through the end of September, and appellant abandoned the job September 9th. He was paid on August
9th on the last estimate he had submitted. Even if
arguendo we admit appellant's figures as shown on page
11 of his brief, he would by the end of July only have
been entitled to $34,170.00, less the 10 per cent retention as permitted by the subcontract. (R. 10) He had
received $34,540.00 directly and $500.00 had been paid to
11
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Geneva Rock. This was nearly $1000 more than the
amount contended for without any retention.
Of course, if the work had been going along properly
and plaintiff had not abandoned the job, he would have
been entitled to submit an estimate on September 1st
for his work done in August and to have been paid 90
per cent thereof by September lOth. Under the figures
contended for by appellant through August, appellant
would have been entitled to receive $39,270.00 (less the 10
per cent retention) if he had submitted his August estimate. Appellant had been paid within $300 of this amount
for work done to the end of July, to-wit:
Paid Direct ------------------------------------ $34,540.00
Paid to Geneva Rock Prod.__________
500.00
10 per cent retention on $39,270 3,927.00
Total ---------------------------------------- $38,967.00
Therefore, even if appellant had submitted an estimate for work done in August, and had done so on the
basis of the theory urged by appellant on page 11 of
his brief, appellant had been overpaid to such an extent by August 9th that he would have had only $300
coming when the estimate became due on September lOth.
(e) On page 65 of the Transcript and in Interrogatory No. 8 (R. 77) appellant admits that the total outof-pocket cost of his work through September 9th, ·was
about $36,000.00. This included the unpaid bills (Tr. 65)
Since by the 9th of August he had received $34,540.00
and $500.00 had been paid on account to Geneva Rock
12
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Products, the payments by August 9th came within
$1,000.00 of his total out-of-pocket costs, including his
unpaid bills, plus all costs incurred in August and through
September 9th. This fact alone conclusively demonstrates
that it was not the amount paid by respondent which
caused him to leave his bills unpaid, for debts incurred in
March and April were still unpaid. (Tr. 67 and 71)
(f) The contract price of $51,000.00 for placing 5,400
cubic yards of concrete computes out at $9.45 per cubic
yard. It is admitted by appellant, however, that he based
his estimates and billings on a $10.00 per cubic yard
price, and was paid on that basis. (See for example Ex.
8 and Tr. 983.) This further liberalized the payments to
him.
(g) Finally, as will he argued in answer to Point I,
during the same period of time defendant had furnished a
crane to place the concrete and had done plaintiff's work
in two areas at a total cost, as found by the court, of
nearly $7,500.00. This was not deducted from the payments made because Nelson said he needed the money
(Tr. 146)
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that his financial distress was not caused by any default or failure to
cooperate on the part of the respondent.

PoiNT

II

SINCE APPELLANT BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY ABANDONING THE WORK, HE
13
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IS NOT ENTITLED TO CONTINUE TO ENFORCE THE BENEFITS OF THE CONTRACT.
The title used by appellant in his Point I indicates
that appellant erroneously believes that he is still entitled
to enforce the contract and have the benefit of all of its
terms, even though he breached it and abandoned the
work. When plaintiff abandoned the contract, less than
75 per cent of the work had been completed. (R. 165) His
failure to complete the work was, of course, a material
breach of contract. Having breached the contract, it is
fundamental law that he can not continue to enforce it,
or to have its benefits. His right to recover for work
completed prior to September 9th can not be based on the
contract, but can be allowed, if at all, only on a quantum
meruit basis to prevent an unjust enrichment.
If plaintiff could continue to recover the full contract
price less only the naked cost of completing the work, it
would permit him to turn his own wrong (the breach of
contract) into a triumph. If this were the law, it probably
would be advantageous to a contractor to a bandon the
work. Usually a prime contractor can complete the work
as efficiently and for about the same cost as the subcontractor could have done it. If the subcontractor could
abandon the work and still recover on the contract he
would be permitted to have the benefits of the contract
without having had any of its burdens. Because this result is unreasonable, the cases IlC'Yer permit such a recovery. The general law clearly is that full, or at least
substantial, performance of the \York is a condition precedent to payment. Since the denial of any recovery often
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would unjustly enrich the owner (in this case the prime
contractor), the courts permit the contractor to recover on
a quantum meruit basis, but only for the reasonable value
of the work he has performed less the owner's damage.
We will not labor the point. The cases dealing with this
are noted by the West Digest System under Key No.
319 (1) and I{ey No. 297, where numerous cases are noted.
The general rule is discussed in 12 Am. J ur. 903
as follows:
'' ... partial performance of an entire and indivisible contract by one of the parties does not
entitle him to performance of the contract by the
other and does not wa,rrant a, recovery by the former against the laUer upon the contract. Full or
substantial performance of the promise of one
party is a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action on the promise of the other. . . . ''
(Emphasis supplied)
The rule is also recognized in 17 C. J. S. Section
511 as follows :
"Ordinarily, there can be no recovery on an
entire contract for part performance although
there may be a recovery pro tanto or on the quantum meruit for accepted benefits or in case full
performance was prevented by the other party.
Different rules apply to severable contracts.''
The Utah Supreme Court recognized and applied
this rule in Ryan. v. Curlew Irrigation & Reservoir Co., 36
Utah 382, 104 P. 218. This case involved the construction
of a dam. The plaintiff brought suit on the contract to
recover a sum which he claimed was still due to him. He
15
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alleged that he had complied with the provisions of the
contract for the building of the dam but the defendant
contended that he had not completed his work. This issue
was submitted to a jury and the jury found in favor of
the defendant. The Supreme Court said:
''In an action upon the contract, appellant cannot recover unless and until he shows that he has,
substantially at least, complied with its provisions.
Appellant alleged that he had so complied andrespondent denied these allegations and much
evidence was directed to the issue thus presented. . . . "
The jury had found the issues in favor of the defendant
and thus had found that the contractor had not completed
the dam as required by the contract. The court then
noted:
''The jury allowed him (the contractor) the
contract price for all material furnished and all
work done by him. In view that the jury have
found that the dam was not completed in accordance with the terms of the contract, and the finding being supported by the evidence, we think the
appellant was allowed all that he was entitled to."
See also Miller v. You,ng (Okla.) 172 P. 2d 994; Kennard v. Keller, (Cal.) 269 P. 114; Miller v. Yockey, (Colo.)
112 P. 772; Hanley v. Walker, (Mich.), 45 N.W. 573.
In Miller v. Young, supra,. the plaintiff took over work
which had already been commenced, and agreed to complete it. He later quit without legal excuse. The owner
wouldn't pay him anything, and he brought suit. The
16
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lower court granted judgment, but the appellate court reversed, stating:
"It is an elementary principle of law of contracts that in order to recover upon a contract, the
contractor . . . must first establish his own performance or a valid excuse for his failure to perform (citing authorities including Am. Juris).
Since plaintiff failed under the uncontradicted
proof to complete the work he contracted to do,
without valid excuse for such failure, he was entitled to no judgment against defendant.''
There are authorities recognizing that he should be
paid on a quantum meruit basis.
See for example, Eckes v. Luce, (Okla) 173 P. 219.
The holding is reflected by the following headnote :
''A building contractor who entered into a contract with the owner to furnish material and labor
and to remove the old and build a new front in a
storeroom according to plans and specifications
and was to receive therefor the sum of $725, and
after certain materials had been furnished and
part of the labor performed on the contract the
contractor abandoned the work, the owner accepted the work done and materials furnished,
completed the work at his own expense. Held, the
contractor is entitled to recover for the work done
and materials furnished according to the contract
price, in proportion that the same bears to the
completed work, less the damages sustained by
the owner by reason of the contractor's failure to
complete the work.''
See also Ball v. Dolatn, 21 S. D. 619, 114 N.W. 98.
Under these authorities the very most the plain17
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tiff was entitled to was credit for the reasonable value
of the work he did, less respondents' damages. He was
not entitled to be paid an.ything for the work he did not
do. The trial court went far beyond this here and its
decision is much more favorable to the appellant than he
was entitled to under the foregoing authorities.
The court had found, as discussed above in Point I,
that the plaintiff had breached the contract by abandoning the work and had required the respondents to complete it. The court had no direct evidence as to the reasonable value of the work actually done by the appellant.
Only 4,367 yards of concrete had been formed and placed
at the time the appellant abandoned the work (R. 105)
and of this the respondents had formed and poured the
columns and beams in the gym and administration areas,
and had furnished a crane to place substantial parts of
the concrete. We will detail the evidence on this below.
It also was admitted that on the entire job covered by
the contract, a total of 5,982 yards of concrete was placed.
(R. 106) Even though respondents had formed and
poured the last 1,615 yards and had done the columns and
beams, the court awarded the plaintiff credit for the full
contract price of $9.45 per cubic yard, on the entire 5,982
cubic yards of concrete, whereas it should have limited
him to the value of the work done by him. The court then
totaled the respondents' total cost for the concrete work
covered by the entire contract. These costs consisted of
the $35,540.00 paid directly to the plaintiff and Geneva
Rock Products, the $5,903.81 which the respondents would
yet have to pay to unpaid materialmen and laborers, the
18
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costs respondents had incurred in completing the forming and placing 1,615 yards which were left to be poured
when plaintiff abandoned the work ($12,527.14); the crane
rental for placing concrete while plaintiff was on the
job and the cost to the respondents of forming and pouring the columns and beams in the gym deck and the administration area ($7,569.00). It found that defendants'
total costs thus exceeded the contract price respondents
would have paid if plaintiff had performed his contract
by the amount of $5,010.65, and awarded defendants
judgment therefor. See Findings 6-9 (R. 106-7) The
court recognized expressly in Finding 10:
"That if the plaintiff is charged with said
$5,010.65 (respondents' excess costs), plaintiff
will be given credit for all the concrete poured at
the contract price of $9.45 per yard, and this results in a, substarn.tial credit to the plaintiff, which
plaintiff would not have received if plaintiff had
only been given credit for the 4,367 yards, ':l' * *
completed before the work was abandoned, but
the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to any
benefit which accrued by reason of defendant
being able to complete the remaining work for a
lesser cost per yard than the contract price.''
The court went on to find that it was awarding this credit
because the work remaining to be done would be less
expensive per yard.
Thus, the Utah Supreme Court and the general authorities hold that when a contractor fails to complete his
\York, he is entitled to a credit against the owners' damage for the value of the work done by him, but no more.
Here the trial court has given him credit, not only for
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credit relates to the columns and beams in the pan area,
after having first denied it. (Tr. 82-83) When he was
asked about this on his deposition, he said he couldn't
remember anything about why he gave this credit. (Tr.
51) At the trial he "remembered" that Rosenlof forced
him to bill it this way. (Tr. 82) It is thus admitted that
Rosenlof did do the work, and before the work was abandoned Nelson even gave credit for it in his invoice. (Ex. 8)
Both parties also admit that Rosenlof - not Nelson
--did the beams in the Administrative area. (Tr. 81,
128)
The court let appellant have the contract price on
the full 5,982 yards of concrete work done on the whole
job, and charged him only with the defendants' excess
cost above the agreed contract price. While we believe
that this is more favorable than the law allows, we did
not cross-appeal because it perhaps reaches substantially
the same end result as would a proper quantum meruit
approach.
PoiNT III
THE FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE FORMS CONVERTED HAD A MARKET
VALUE OF $4,000.00 IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
This court has stated on many occasions that the
measure of damages for conversion is the market Yalue
of the item converted at or near the time of the conversion. Such is the rule as stated by the Utah Supreme
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Court in the case cited by appellant, to-wit Lym v. Thompson, 112 Utah 24, 184 P. 2d 667, where the court said:
''As a general rule the measure of the value
of an item of converted property which has a market is value at the time and place of conversion."
In that case the court did ''uphold'' a trial court finding
which based the value on cost new upon a showing that
most of the pipe was new or ''the equivalent of new.''
Here appellant seeks to" reverse" because the trial court
would not accept "cost" as "value." There the court
commented that although some of the pipe was "equivalent of new," it was not new pipe, but the price would
be difficult to determine, because "plaintiff's pipe is not
possible of identification, an appraisal is impossible."
The Utah Supreme Court has also held in K n.ighton.
v. Manning, 84 Utah 1, 33 P. 2d 401 (1933) that the failure
to prove the value of property alleged to have been converted, completely precludes recovery on the theory of
conversion.
In Haycraft v. Adams, 82 Utah 347, 24 P. 2d 1110
(1933), the Supreme Court elaborated on the sufficiency
of the proof of value. That case involved an auctioneer
who had sold certain personal property at the request of
a wife, without the permission of her husband. In an
action by the husband for conversion of the property, the
jury awarded the husband $750.00 as the market value
of the property at the time it was converted. The defendant appealed, relying principally on the ground
that the evidence introduced as to value 'iYas in23
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sufficient to support the verdict. In that regard the
plaintiff's evidence (as did plaintiff's here) consisted
only of the cost of the items when purchased, plus evidence as to what their cost new would have been if they
had been purchased at the time of the trial. He had also
called a witness who stated that the property ''doesn't
depreciate very much." The court noted (as here) that
the property converted was still in the possession of the
defendant and could have been examined, and that it was
the duty of the plaintiff to produce evidence as to the
market value. The court then said:
"Plaintiff apparently took the position that
cost price was sufficient. The plaintiff made no
attempt to supply any information as to the condition of the furniture or any other facts which
might establish value, except the cost prices.''
It then reversed the lower court, because under these
facts it had erred in placing its verdict on cost.
Here Max Rosenlof testified that in his opinion the
forms at the completion of the job should not be appraised at more than $4,000.00 (Tr. 138) He was speaking about" all" of the forms, and the court accepted this
uncontradicted testimony. \Ve emphasize the word'' all,''
because as is noted below, only a part of the forms were
converted. As in the Haycraft case, supra, the trial court
also had before it appellant's testimony concerning the
original cost of the forms. He introduced the original
invoices and a summary thereof, showing a total cost of
$17,707.49, but the invoices included some hard·ware and
bolts, as can be seen by comparing the items in the sum24
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mation with the invoices. The $17,707.00 :figure also includes one invoice dated March 21, 1958, for sixty 2 x 8
panels at a unit price of $57.90 each. However, the invoice also shows that only 34 of these 60 were shipped,
and the balance were back-ordered. There is no testimony to show that the 26 which were backordered were
on the job. This $17,707.00 figure also reflects the price
of ''all'' the forms, whereas the evidence only shows that
60 per cent thereof were converted. (We will detail this
evidence below.) It will also be noted that the major portion of the forms shown in Ex. 4 were purchased between
May of 1955 and April of 1957.
Also, as in the Haycraft case, Mr. Nelson testified
that the price of forms new had increased in recent years,
and that it would now cost $20,071.00 to purchase the
forms new. (Tr. 24) He admitted that the forms depreciate with use; (Tr. 72) that the amount of depreciation
will depend on how they are used and what care is taken
to maintain them; that the use of the forms on the State
.Jiental Hospital (the conversion) might not have hurt
them very much if they were properly taken care of. (Tr.
73) He also indicated that these forms had been used
"approximately" 300 to 400 times, and that with proper
care they might have been used a total of 1,000 times, if
"taken care of." (Tr. 73) He did not, however, give one
word of testimony as to the condition of the forms or how
they had been maintained.
The trial court expressly found that the subcontract
agreement (R. 10) permitted the respondents to use the
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forms to complete the work, and that the use of the forms
to complete the work was not a conversion. (Finding 11,
R. 109)
It also found that respondents had acquired ownership of a chattel mortgage on the forms and had foreclosed the mortgage by private sale; that plaintiff had
had notice of the sale, but had made no effort to bid for
the forms or to protect his mortgagor's interest therein.
(Finding 14 R. 109) This mortgage by its terms expressly also permitted the holder of the mortgage to
hold possession of the forms if the mortgage were in default. (See Ex. 14, Finding 14) It was in default. (Tr.
28) Therefore, the use of the forms and their possession
after September 9, 1958, was not a conversion.
The evidence, however, did show that Rosenlof used
some of the forms twice in completing some work at the
State Mental Hospital. He was not asked for any detail.
His total testimony on this use is at page 144, and is as
follows:
'' Q. In respect to the forms that we are talking
about, the use of the forms, I think in the
answer to the interrogations you indicated
you have used these forms on two other jobs,
is that correct~
''A. One other job.

"Q. What other job was that~
''A. The State l\[ental Hospital.
'' Q. When did you use those forms~ When did
you go to that job~
''A. In March of 1959 we started it.''
26
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The interrogatory to which counsel was referring is
Interrogatory No. 3 (R. 35) and the answer thereto (R.
38) in which Rosenlof stated that "about 60 per cent
of the forms were used twice." This is all the evidence
there is to identify the forms which were converted.
Rosenlof was also asked by the same interrogatory
to state where the forms were and he answered:
"Forms are now located at 1400 North State,
Provo, Utah.''

ro

,n~

ill.

So the forms were available and could have been
appraised and their market value ascertained. But
plaintiff made no effort to do this. Counsel also had Mr.
Rosenlof on the stand and cross-examined him about his
answer to the interrogatory on the use of the forms
(Tr. 144) but he did not see fit to ask him which forms
were used, whether they were the newest ones or the
older ones, or which ones, and the trial court was totally
without evidence from which it could have determined
which of the forms were converted. The burden in this
regard was, of course, on the plaintiff.
The trial court expressly found that only" part" of
the forms were converted- no other finding could have
been sustained by the evidence. (Finding 15) It also
found from the only competent evidence it had on market value that" all" of the forms had a value of $4,000.00.
Still it awarded Nelson the full $4,000.00, although only
60 per cent of the forms had been converted. (Finding
15) If the forms used on the State Mental Hospital and
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thus converted were a fair average as to value, this
$4,000.00 award was tantamount to a $6,6o6.00 award for
the 60 per cent which were converted.
We are not here confronted with a situation where the
trial court accepted ''cost'' as ''value,'' because the court
under this evidence refused to do so. It did have before
it the testimony of Rosenlof that at the completion of the
job "all" the forms should not be appraised at more than
$4,000.00, and under the subcontract we had the right to
use the forms, to the end of the job. (R. 10) The trial
court elected to believe this evidence, and refused to
accept Nelson's testimony concerning cost as the measure
of the value of forms. This is perfectly reasonable. Most
of them were bought in 1955-1957. (Tr. 44) They do depreciate with age and use. (Tr. 72) The court had no
evidence as to their condition. On an average, the forms
had been used 300 or 400 times. If the forms had not been
available for an appraisal, cost might have been given
more weight - but the forms were in Provo where the
case was tried. (R. 38) The court did have the testimony
of Rosenlof to the effect that the forms should not be
appraised at more than $4,000.00, (Tr. 138) and it so
found.
This brings us to the contention that plaintiff should
have had a new trial. The granting or the denying of a
motion for a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the
trial court, and it should not be disturbed in the absence
of a clear abuse of that discretion. This court has so held
on many occasions. (See, for example, Uptown Appliance
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v. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 P. 2d 826.) The trial court
did not abuse its discretion here.

On October 5th the appellant served interrogatories
for the first time to ascertain the location of the forms
and whether or not they had been used on other jobs.
(R. 35) These interrogatories were promptly answered,
and by October 20th, appellant knew where the forms were
and that 60 per cent of them had been used twice on the
State Mental job, but plaintiff made no effort to have
them appraised or to look at them himself.
The case was tried commencing November 5th, and
both sides submitted detailed written memoranda. (R.
42, 70) The respondents argued to the court that the
appellant's evidence using ''cost'' as ''value'' was not
proper and all the arguments made here were made in
the court below. The Haycraft case discussing the use of
the cost as evidence of value was referred to. (R. 61-2)
Notwithstanding this, the later memorandum filed by
appellant only asserted that he was entitled to the ''full
value of the property converted,'' and he urged the court
to award him $20,071.00 on his testimony as to what the
forms would cost now if they were new. (Tr. 24, R. 72)
The trial court on December 8, 1959, rendered a memorandum decision. (R. 75) in which it accepted Rosenlof's
testimony of $4,000.00 as to the value of the forms. On
December 22nd appellant filed a ''Motion for Reconsideration," and stated as one of the grounds that the
court "had failed to give weight or had overlooked the
evidence of value in respect to the forms converted by the
defendant. No affidavits were tendered, no request was
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made for an opportunity to reopen to introduce further
evidence. Plaintiff simply indicated that he desired to
further argue the use of his cost figures as a measure of
damages. The parties appeared before the court again
and further argued the matter, and still no affidavits were
filed and no effort was made to reopen to offer further
testimony. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a further
memorandum decision on February 10, 1960, (R. 89) and
findings of fact and conclusions of law were signed on
March 10, 1960. Only then did the plaintiff seek to reopen.
Even then it was not alleged either in the affidavits or
in the motion that there was any accident or surprise
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against,
nor that he had newly discovered evidence which appellant could not have discovered with reasonable diligence
and produced at the trial, as contemplated by Rule 59(a).
The appellant simply elected his theory and tried
his case. Had he ''sold'' his theory, he could have
"clipped" respondents for $20,000.00, but he failed. He
reargued his theories on a motion for reconsideration
and again failed. Now he wants to retry the case and
adopt a different theory and now produce evidence which
was readily available to him at the trial, but which he had
elected not to use.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD \V. CLYDE
Attorney for Respondents
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